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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aimed to investigate the effects of employee benefits on employee productivity. There are conflicting views, 
positive and negative, with regard to the effect of employee benefits on employee productivity. Overall, we found that 
employee benefits have a positive impact on employee productivity through the embodied effect (direct effect). 
Specifically, according to a workplace panel survey in Korea conducted between 2005 and 2009, an in crease of one 
unit in employee benefits leads to an increase of employee productivity by about 7.9%. In addition, we found that such 
effect is stronger in the manufacturing industry than in the non-manufacturing industry. Although there is no 
difference in the effect of benefits between large firms and small and medium-sized firms, the labor-embodied effect  
is stronger in large firms, and the capital-embodied effect is salient in small and medium-sized firms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
irms use various compensation systems to boost employee productivity. These compensation systems 
aim at providing a reward in response to individual performance. However, benefits, one of the 
components of compensation systems, are provided in response to the affiliation of a firm, not to 
individual performance (Williams & MacDermid, 1994). Hence, there are very few studies that have investigated the 
effect of benefits on individual or firm performance. Yet, it is important to understand the effect of benefits on 
individual or firm performance because the portion of benefits out of the total compensation is growing. A few of 
researchers argue that the benefits can also be offered to employees based on individual performance. 
 
Benefits represent all forms of rewards, except monetary reward (Mikovich & Newman, 1990). There have been 
conflicting arguments regarding the effect of benefits on employee performance. From the economic point of view, 
benefits negatively influence employees and firms. According to the agent theory and transaction cost theory, benefits 
increase moral hazard and free-rider problems among employees, thereby resulting in the increase of benefits costs of 
firms. On the other hand, other researchers argue that benefits increase employee motivation and in turn, the increased 
motivation positively influences both individual and firm performance. 
 
This paper intends to investigate the effect of benefits on employee productivity in Korean firms. In addition, we 
investigate the conditions when the effect of benefits is salient to suggest proper implications for government policies. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
There have been conflicting arguments over the effect of benefits on firm performance. The negative relationship 
regarding such effect is supported by the agent theory and transaction cost theory. According to these two theories, 
employees (agent) pursue their interest rather than that of the firm (principle) due to the imbalance of information  
between the two actors as well as the imperfection of monitoring employees (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, 
there is a likelihood of employees’ moral hazard and adverse selection (undesired results occur when the agent and 
principal have asymmetric information) due to asymmetric information. Therefore, agents execute their job even 
though the level of benefits increase and the likelihood of moral hazard and adverse selection do not change. In turn, 
employee productivity is not affected by benefits. 
F 
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On the other hand, the positive relationship between employee benefits and individual or firm performance has been 
also investigated. The expansion of employee benefits provides employees with motivation and in turn, the increased 
level of motivation prevents employee from quitting a job and help them develo p. Finally, firm productivity or 
performance can increase as well. According to the labor turnover model, the opportunity costs of turnover are defined 
as the costs used for hiring employees and placing them through training and development (Hom, Caranikas -Walker, 
Prussia, and Griffeth, 1992). Such opportunity costs of turnover hinder firms’ competitive advantage. Thus, 
competitive monetary compensation and benefits play an important role in preventing turnovers. Further, the 
expansion of benefits inhibits employee turnover and helps firms to keep capable employees. 
 
Second, most components of benefits are positively related with individual satisfaction (Dulebohn, Molloy, Pichler, 
and Murray, 2008). Such positive relationship between the two increases the level of individual motivation and in 
turn, the increased level of individual motivation positively affects individual and firm performance. Such positive 
effect of benefits on individual motivation is explained by two theories. The two-factor theory suggests that employee 
benefits are categorized as a motivator to boost individual motivation.  If a motivator is satisfied, an employee’s 
individual motivation is improved. However, even though the motivator is not satisfied, the employee’s motivation is 
not led to dissatisfaction. Therefore, the level of benefits increases individual motivation. The expectancy theory 
(Vroom, 1964) also provides support for the positive association between benefits and individual motivation. 
Individual motivation consists of three elements: expectation, instrumentality and valence. Benefits enhance the level 
of valence. This effect implies that benefits can improve individual motivation by increasing the level of valence if 
the other two elements are constant. In turn, the increased level of individual motivation positively influences 
individual productivity. 
 
There are very few empirical researches on the effect of benefits on individual productivity. Most studies investigate 
the effect of a specific component of benefits rather than the overall level of benefits. For instance, employee stock 
ownership plan (ESOP) and flexible work schedule have been extensively studied. However, there are conflict 
empirical results on the effect of ESOP. Using a sample of Japanese firms, Jones and  Kato (1993) found a positive 
relationship between the portions of employees who bought ESOP stocks and firm performance. On the other hand, 
Kruse (1992) suggested that there is no association between ESOP and firm performance, using a sample of American  
firms. Researchers overall proposed that further studies are needed to investigate the effect of ESOP through utilizing  
an enhanced research design and better data. With regard to flexible work schedules, extensive studies have been 
performed due to the diverse forms of flexible work schedules. Pierce and Newstrom (1980) found that flexible work 
schedules engender employees to utilize their competency more effectively because employees can better understand 
their condition and do their best. Schein, Maurer, and Novak (1977) also discovered the positive effect of flexib le 
work schedules on individual productivity using a sample of 246 employees in the manufacturing industry. However, 
these results were not extended to white workers (Kim & Campagna, 1981). 
 
Few studies investigate the direct relationship between the overall benefits and productivity. Firm productivity was 
measured in various ways. Some used indirect measures of firm performance, such as employee turnover, engagement 
or satisfaction (Dreher, Ash, & Bretz, 1988; Micelli & Lane, 1991). Others directly measured firm performance using 
employee motivation, added value per employee or sales per employee (Hong et al., 1995). Choi (1996) was the first 
to examine the relationship between benefits and productivity. He found that benefits positively affect firm 
productivity through increased motivation and the stability of the labor market. Kang (2002) also tested this 
relationship using 308 manufacturing firms. According to his results, benefit costs per emp loyee increased the added 
value per employee and sales per employee. Shin (2005) investigated the effect of intra-company labor welfare fund 
on employee productivity using the financial statements of unlisted and listed companies between 1992 and 2000. As 
a result, he noted a positive relationship between the two. In addition, he also found that such positive effect is stronger 
for small and medium-sized firms, meaning that the positive effect of benefits on employee productivity decreases as 
the size of the benefit target is larger. This impact implies that the socialization of benefits escalates the likelihood of 
moral hazard and employee free-riding and in turn, diminishes employee productivity. In sum, benefits have a positive 
impact on employee turnover (Kang and Kang, 1998), employee engagement and job satisfaction (Dulebohn, Molloy, 
Pichler, and Murray, 2008).  
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In addition to the direct relationship between benefits and firm productivity, this paper investigates the factors which 
moderate this relationship. First, we consider two types of effects of benefits: embodied and disembodied effects. 
Theoretically, the effect of benefits can be categorized into a direct effect (i.e., embodied effect) and an indirect effect 
(i.e., disembodied effect). The embodied effect is defined as the effect that influences the productivity through 
elements of production. This effect is also categorized as the labor-embodied and capital-embodied effect. The labor-
embodied effect implies the increase of productivity through increased loyalty, increased labor intensity and decrease 
in absence. The capital-embodied effect means the increase of productivity through the maximizat ion of a facility’s  
utilization and the minimization of raw materials. On the other hand, the disembodied effect is the increase of 
productivity through favorable relations between the union and management and the increase of organizational 
efficiency (Shin, 2005). Second, we consider the characteristics of firms such as industry and size. The effect of 
benefits may differ by a firm’s industry and size. In Korea, the size of benefits and working conditions are different  
according to a firm’s industry and size, resulting in different effects of benefits on a firm’s productivity.  
 
This study contributes to the current literature in four ways. First, this study adopted the overall level of benefits, an 
important index for employee benefits. Shin (2005) concentrated on the intra-company welfare fund, which is a part 
of the employee benefits package. Considering the portion of the intra-company welfare fund to overall benefits (1.8% 
~ 3.3%), it is critical to examine the effects of the overall benefits on employee productivity. In addition, this study 
also investigated the different effects of benefits on employee productivity considering two types of effects (embodied 
versus disembodied effects) and firm type, such as large versus small and medium-sized firms and manufacturing 
versus non-manufacturing firms. 
 
Second, we increased the generalizability by using a workplace panel survey (WPS), which extensively covers firms  
in Korea. The purpose of WPS is to acquire comparability among firms by sampling reprehensive firms by industry, 
size and region (Korea Labor Institute). For instance, Shin (2005) used a sample of 1,710 firms that have an intra-
company welfare fund. This sample accounts for only 3% of all firms whose financial statements are available in 
Korea. Therefore, there may be a generalizability issue in this sample. 
 
CURRENT STATE OF BENEFITS IN KOREA 
 
Benefits represent all costs used for employee welfare, except monetary rewards such as salary, bonus and overtime 
pay (Williams and MacDermid, 1994). Benefits are categorized into two: legal welfare expense and non-legal welfare 
expense. Legal welfare expense are those that are covered by law. It includes health insurance, pension, occupational 
health and safety insurance, and unemployment insurance. Non-legal welfare includes all costs, except legal welfare 
expense, such as intra-company welfare fund, dwelling expense and education cost. 
 
Benefits per employee are on the rise. According to the Ministry of Employment and Labor in Korea, benefits per 
employee in 2005 were 385,900 won, but increased to 498,600 won (30%) in 2012 (Table 1). However, benefits per 
employee decreased in 2008 (6%) and in 2010 (2%). These drops are explained by the fluctuation of legal and non -
legal welfare expense. With regard to legal welfare expense, there is a growing trend. On the other hand, non-legal 
welfare expense fluctuated during 2005 and 2012. For example, it dropped by 18% in 2008 and remained constant  in 
2009. In 2010, it dropped again by 9%. In the subsequent year, it surged by 15% and dropped by a small margin . 
Therefore, it can be observed that the trend of benefits per employee seems to be influenced by non-legal welfare 
expense, not by legal welfare expense. The large drops of benefits per employee in 2008 and 2010 went along with 
those of non-legal welfare expense. Hence, non-legal welfare expense is more vulnerable to the external environment. 
In 2008, the subprime mortgage crisis influenced the world financial market. Consequently, this impact caused a 
decrease in non-legal welfare expense. 
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Table 1. Employee benefits per employee (2005 ~ 2012) 
Year Employee benefits Legal employee benefits Non-legal employee benefits 
2005 385.9 208.2 177.7 
2006 436.6 228.6 208.0 
2007 468.0 243.6 224.4 
2008 440.3 255.5 184.8 
2009 444.2 259.1 185.1 
2010 436.0 266.7 169.3 
2011 475.6 280.1 195.5 
2012 498.6 296.8 201.8 
(Unit: 1,000 Won, 1USD=1,034.50KRW) 
Source: Survey on the Labor Cost of Company (2005~2012), Ministry of Employment & Labor (Korean Government)  
 
 
With regard to the components of legal welfare expense, pension accounted for the largest portion, followed by health 
insurance, occupational health and safety insurance, and unemployment insurance (Table 2). Meal cost consisted of 
the largest part (39%) in non-legal welfare expense, followed by other expenses, education cost and dwelling expense 
(Table 3). 
 
 
Table 2. Legal employee benefits per employee 
Year 
Legal 
benefits 
Health 
insurance 
Health and safety 
insurance 
Pension 
Unemployment 
insurance 
Disability 
employment levy 
others 
2005 208.2 54.3 35.9 89.3 25.4 1.9 1.3 
2006 228.6 58.1 45.1 94.6 27.3 2.1 1.5 
2007 243.6 62.7 48.4 98.8 29.2 2.3 2.1 
2008 255.5 77.4 45.0 98.4 31.8 2.1 0.7 
2009 259.1 79.7 45.0 99.2 32.7 2.2 0.3 
2010 266.7 82.6 46.5 101.3 33.4 2.1 0.8 
2011 280.1 95.9 43.9 102.6 34.6 2.4 0.8 
2012 296.8 104.8 44.3 106.4 38.0 2.9 0.4 
(Unit: 1,000 Won, 1USD=1,034.50KRW) 
Source: Survey on the Labor Cost of Company (2005~2012), Ministry of Employment & Labor (Korean Government)  
 
 
Table 3. Non-legal employee benefits per employee 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
2005 177.7 10.2 7.8 74.1 9.6 6.6 16.3 8.4 0.5 4.0 6.0 - 34.9 
2006 208.0 11.9 8.4 77.5 - - - - 0.8 - - - 109.4 
2007 224.4 13.4 9.2 82.2 15.3 - 25.8 15.6 0.9 13.9 - 4.5 43.6 
2008 184.8 13.7 9.8 72.6 9.9 - 23.3 11.6 0.8 11.4 - 1.4 30.3 
2009 185.1 14.8 10.7 73.1 10.1 - 24.3 8.0 1.1 10.9 - 0.9 31.2 
2010 169.3 11.4 9.4 68.4 9.5 - 20.6 9.0 1.3 10.7 - 2.1 26.9 
2011 195.5 15.9 12.4 77.5 10.0 - 23.7 9.6 1.3 12.5 - 0.5 32.2 
2012 201.8 14.6 12.0 81.7 10.7 - 24.4 10.7 1.7 13.4 - 0.7 32.0 
Source: Survey on the Labor Cost of Company (2005~2012), Ministry of Employment & Labor (Korean Government)  
 
1. Non-legal benefits 
2. Residence expense 
3. Health costs 
4. Dining Costs 
5. Insurance support fund 
6. Expenses for congratulations and condolences  
7. Education expense 
8. Intra-Company Labor Welfare Fund 
9. Child care fund 
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10. Worker rest expense 
11. Employee stock ownership plan 
12. Employee's stock ownership fund 
13. Others 
 
METHODS 
 
An increase in firm productivity is cause by the following two factors. First, the increased volume of factors of 
production, such as labor and capital, can increase a firm’s output. Second, the changed method of using factors of 
production can also raise the level of a firm’s output (Lee, 2012). Although the production function considers only 
labor and capital input, benefits can also positively influence a firm’s output. For example, the increase in benefits has 
an impact on labor relations or firm culture (disembodied effect) or on the effective use of labor or capital (embodied  
effect)1. This relation is represented by the Cobb-Douglas production function (equation 1). 
 
𝑄 = 𝐴(1 + 𝛿𝑋 + 𝜃𝑊 )𝐿𝛼 𝐾𝛽   (1) 
 
Q refers to the volume of a firm’s production, A is constant for effectiveness, X is a factor that influences a firm’s  
production, except labor and capital, W is benefits, L is the number of employees, and K is the volume of a firm’s  
capital. δ is an elasticity, except for labor and capital. θ is a disembodied elasticity of employee welfare. α is the labor 
elasticity of output and β is the capital elasticity of output. 
 
If the information of company (i) and time (t) were added to formula (1), the formula can be changed as follows.  
 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴(1 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑊𝑖 ,𝑡   )𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡
𝛼 𝐾𝑖 ,𝑡
𝛽
  (2) 
 
Formula (2) is expressed as equation (3), which reflects the disembodied and embodied productivity of employee 
welfare (Bloom, 1985; Kruse, 1992; Shin, 2005). Q (i,t) is the output of company (i) in the year of (t). W(i,t) is the 
employee welfare of company (i) in the year of (t). δ is the labor elasticity of output  and α is the capital elasticity of 
output. θ is the labor-embodied effect of employee welfare and β is the capital-embodied effect of employee welfare 
(Bloom, 1985; Kruse, 1992; Shin, 2005)2 
 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴(1 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑊𝑖 ,𝑡   )𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡
𝛼1+𝛾1 𝑊𝑖,𝑡  𝐾
𝑖,𝑡
𝛼2+𝛾2 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
 (3) 
 
The productivity effect of employee welfare can be estimated by equation (4). However, this equation was altered 
through the conversion of the logarithmic function and first order Taylor series expansion. 
 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴(1 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑊𝑖 ,𝑡   )𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡
𝛼1+𝛾1 𝑊𝑖,𝑡  𝐾
𝑖,𝑡
𝛼2+𝛾2 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
 (4) 
 
In equation (4), we can express total output (Q(i,t)) as average output (Q/L(i,t)) and change the variable vector (X) for 
each variable. 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖 ,𝑡 = ln(𝐴) + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑊𝑖 ,𝑡   +𝛼1ln (𝐿𝑖,𝑡)+ 𝛼2ln (𝐾𝑖,𝑡)+ 𝛾1𝑊1  ln (𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡)+ 𝛾2𝑊2 ln (𝐾𝑖 ,𝑡) (5) 
 
Average output (Q/L) means labor productivity, and K/L implies capital intensity. RD/L and LC/L are vector variables. 
RD/L means the research and development costs and LC/L is the personnel expense for one employee. D1 and D2 are 
dummy variables (training, labor union).  Econt is the economic growth rate in the year t. πt is the industry-specific 
fixed effect and τt is the time effect.  ϵi,t is the probability error term. 
                                                                 
1
 Technological advance, labor union and organizational culture can also influence a firm’s productivity. In this study, these factors are all 
controlled.  
2
 ln(1+δXi,t + θWi,t) is transformed from δXi,t + θWi,t by the Taylor series expansion. According to the Taylor series expansion, ln(1+δ + θ) 
converges on (δ + θ). Therefore, the effect of the disembodied effect is described as (δXi,t + θWi,t).    
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The result might be biased when the panel model is estimated through OLS or 2SLS regression because these two 
regressions tend to omit fixed firm-specific characteristics (i.e., information of company). For this reason, this study 
used the two-way fixed effect model, which controls the industry-specific fixed effect and time effect. The formula 
can be changed as below if both the industry-specific fixed effect and time effect are considered. We intensify the 
prediction of variables by controlling the variables that can influence productivity, such as labor union or the rate of 
economic growth (Kang, 2002; Kleiner and Lee, 1997). 
 
ln ((
𝑄
𝐿
)𝑖 ,𝑡) = ln(𝐴) + 𝛼2ln (𝐾/𝐿)+ 𝛼2ln (𝐾/𝐿)+𝛿1 ln ((𝑅𝐷/𝐿)𝑖,𝑡)+ 𝛿2 ln ((𝐿𝐶/
𝐿)𝑖,𝑡)+𝛿3𝐷1𝑖 ,𝑡+𝛿4𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑊𝑖,𝑡   +𝛾1𝑊1  ln (𝐿𝑖 ,𝑡)+  𝛾2 𝑊2 ln (𝐾𝑖 ,𝑡)+ 𝛿5𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 +𝜋𝑖+𝜏𝑡+𝜖𝑖 ,𝑡  (6) 
 
DATA 
 
Sample: The workplace panel survey (WPS), which contains comprehensive samples in various industries, has been 
conducted every two years. This survey was designed by the Ministry of Employment and the Labor and Korea Labor 
Institute in order to examine the status of employee development and labor supply and demand. It also aims at 
enhancing the government’s labor policy and the effectiveness of employee development. Therefore, this survey is 
useful for understanding the trend of labor relations and employee development. Moreover, researchers can analyze 
the structure of human resource development, such as the compensation system, evaluation system and reward system, 
and understand the characteristics of Korean labor relations. 
 
WPS has been conducted for 1,626 for-profit organizations and 111 public organizations. As of 2009, 77.6 percent of 
organizations that had been the targets of this survey were maintained. The items of this survey includes the 
characteristics of organizations, status of employee, compensation and evaluation, human resources development, 
employee benefits, and industrial disaster. The target organization was selected by contacting potential target 
organizations. If an organization was chosen, the financial statements and status of employees were prepared. 
Subsequently, officers visited a target organization to conduct an interview. This interview was done using the 
computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI), which was made by the Statistics department in the Netherlands. 
This study acquired 5,377 year-organization observations by using the data of three years (2005, 2007 and 2009). 
After examining the availability of sales, benefits, total capital, R&D expenditure and the number of employees , the 
final year-organization observations were 2,915. 
 
Variables 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Value added per employee and sales per employee were used to capture firm productivity or labor productivity. In 
this study, we used sales per employee as a dependent variable (Table 4). Value added per employee has been widely  
used for labor productivity, which includes the labor cost, which contains the benefits 3. Therefore, the use of value 
added as the dependent variable can cause a repetition of benefits, which then becomes the independent variable. 
However, the usage of sales per employee eliminates this problem4. 
 
Independent Variable 
 
The concept of benefits is classified into two concepts. The broad concept of benefits includes both legal5 and non-
legal welfare expense. On the other hand, the narrow concept of benefits includes only benefits, except legal welfare 
expense. We chose the first concept because we believe that it contains all aspects of benefits. Employee benefits were 
defined as the costs for employee benefits in income statement including legal benefits, healthy expense, supplies 
                                                                 
3
 Added value can be defined in various ways. The Bank of Korea uses an additive way (added value = operating profit + labor costs + financial 
costs + depreciation costs + tax and public imposition), whereas the Korea Development Bank uses a deductive way (added value = output – direct 
production costs). In this study, we adopted the additive way. 
4
 Kruse (1992) and Kang (2002) used sales per employee as a measure of productivity.  
5
 Legal welfare expense includes health and safety insurance, pension, unemployment insurance and employment for the disabled insurance fund. 
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expense, food expense, and education cost in the survey (Williams & MacDermid, 1994). Employee benefits were 
measured by the total costs of employee benefits divided by the total number of employees. We also incorporated  the 
producer price index (PPI) due to the differences of prices among years when the data were collected 6. 
 
Control Variables 
 
We created several control variables at the organizational level in order to account for organizational characteristics; 
labor expense per employee, research and development expense per employee, capital intensity, total asset, size (the 
number of employees), union and training. In addition to these organizational level control variables, we also created 
control variables over the industry level; industry, economic development rate and time (year). 
 
Table 4. Description of variables 
No Variable Description Measure 
1 ln(Sale/L) Sales per employee Log transformation 
2 W Benefits per employee Log transformation 
3 TRAIN Training program Implementation=1, No implementation=0 
4 UNION Union Exist=1, No exist=0 
5 ln(L) Total number of labor Log transformation of the total number of labor 
6 ln(K) Total asset Log transformation of total asset 
7 ln(K/L) Capital intensity Log transformation of capital intensity  
8 ln(LC/L) Wage per employee Log transformation of wage per employee 
9 ln(RD/L) R&D expense per employee Log transformation of R&D expense per employee 
10 ECON A rate of economic growth Percentage 
11 IND 
Industry dummy 
(Manufacturing industry = 1) 
Industry classification code 
12 TIME Year dummy Year (2005=1, 2007=2, 2009=3) 
 
 
Table 5. Basic Statistics of Variables 
No Variable Mean St.Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 ln(Sale/L) 5.42 1.20 1 
      
2 W 1.71 2.06 .49** 1 
     
3 W* ln(L) 9.60 7.68 .31** .34** 1 
    
4 W* ln(K) 18.87 6.44 .67** .61** .81** 1 
   
5 UNION 0.46 0.50 .12** .05** .37** .31** 1 
  
6 TRAIN 0.90 0.30 -.08** -.09** -.17** -.16** -.06** 1 
 
7 ln(L) 5.62 1.58 .19** .07** .95** .67** .38** -.16** 1 
8 ln(K) 11.04 2.44 .63** .37** .83** .95** .35** -.16** .76** 
9 ln(K/L) 5.40 1.59 .78** .50** .30** .79** .17** -.09** .17** 
10 ln(LC/L) 3.60 0.46 .54** .46** .38** .58** .30** -.12** .28** 
11 ln(RD/L) 3.34 1.04 .04* .04* -0.04 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00 -.06** 
12 ECON 3.26 2.03 -.12** -0.02 0.01 -.042* 0.02 -.09** 0.01 
13 IND 0.40 0.24 .20** -.15** -.04** -0.01 -.12** .05** -0.01 
14 SIZE (Large firm = 1) 0.45 0.50 .15** 0.02 .76** .53** .37** -.13** .81** 
Note: p* < 0.05, p** < 0.01; two-tailed tests 
(Table 5 continued on next page) 
 
  
                                                                 
6
 The Bank of Korea investigated PPI. PPI was 86.88 (2005), 87.67 (2006), 88.93 (2007), 96.53(2008), 96.33(2009) and 100.00(2010). PPI in 2010 
was the baseline for calculating PPI in other years.  
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(Table 5 continued) 
 
No Variable Mean St.Dev 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 ln(Sale/L) 5.42 1.20 
       
2 W 1.71 2.06 
       
3 W* ln(L) 9.60 7.68 
       
4 W* ln(K) 18.87 6.44 
       
5 UNION 0.46 0.50 
       
6 TRAIN 0.90 0.30 
       
7 ln(L) 5.62 1.58 
       
8 ln(K) 11.04 2.44 1 
      
9 ln(K/L) 5.40 1.59 .77** 1 
     
10 ln(LC/L) 3.60 0.46 .53** .53** 1 
    
11 ln(RD/L) 3.34 1.04 -0.02 0.02 0.03 1 
   
12 ECON 3.26 2.03 -.04** -.08** -.05** -0.01 1 
  
13 IND 0.40 0.24 .06** .10** -0.02 .06** -0.01 1 
 
14 SIZE (Large firm = 1) 0.45 0.50 .62** .14** .25** -.07** 0.01 -0.00 1 
Note: p* < 0.05, p** < 0.01; two-tailed tests 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 5 presents the basic statistics. Employee productivity (sales per employee) and employee benefits per employee 
increased between 2005 and 2009. To check the multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) were calculated 
from each regression. The range of VIF is from 1.1 to 1.5, which is below the rule-of-thumb cut-off of 10. 
  
Employee benefits are significantly associated with a firm’s productivity through the labor-embodied effects, such as 
labor intensity and turnover rate (β=0.1128, p<0.01) (see Table 6). A firm’s productivity inc reases by 11.3% when 
employee benefits increase by one unit. The capital-embodied effect (e.g., efficient use of facility and raw materials ) 
on firm productivity was negative and significant (β=-.0331, p<0.01). Considering the two effects, a firm’s  
productivity increases by about 8% when employee benefits increase by one unit. However, the productivity effect of 
employee welfare through the disembodied effect (improvement of organizational culture and labor-management  
relations) is not significant. 
Furthermore, labor union, training and R&D are not significantly related with a firm’s productivity. On the other hand, 
capital intensity and personnel expense are significantly and positively associated with a firm’s productivity 
(β=0.7759, p<0.01, β=0.4424, p<0.01). Moreover, the amount of labor has a negative effect on a firm’s productivity 
(β=-1.1796, p<0.01, implying that a firm’s productivity decreases when the number of employee increases.  
 
Table 6. Results of Regression of Employee Benefits (cluster: firm) 
Fixed effect estimation 
 DV: Sales per employee 
Model 1 
Variable β SE 
W -.1851 (.1242) 
W* Ln(L) .1128*** (.0178) 
W* Ln(K) -.0331*** (.0122) 
UNION .0976 (.1453) 
TRAIN -.0118 (.0750) 
Ln(K/L) .7759*** (.1802) 
Ln(L) -1.1796*** (.2555) 
Ln(RD/L) -.0128 (.0176) 
Ln(LC/L) .4424*** (.0616) 
R2 0.4287 
N 1573 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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We also compare the effect of employee benefits on firm productivity between the manufacturing and the non -
manufacturing industries7 (see Table 7). The effect of employee benefits on firm productivity in the manufacturing 
industry is stronger than that in the non-manufacturing industry. In the manufacturing industry, firm productivity 
through the labor-embodied effect increases by 10.9% when employee benefits increase by one unit (β=0.1085, 
p<0.01). In the non-manufacturing industry, firm productivity through the labor-embodied effect increase by 9.2% 
when employee benefits increase by one unit (β=0.0919, p<0.01). Hence, the effect of employee benefits through the 
capital-embodied effect on firm productivity is negative and significant (β=-.0258, P<0.1). However, this effect is 
very marginal. 
 
The amount of labor has a negative effect on firm productivity. This implies that firm productivity decreases when the 
number of workers increases in both industries. On the other hand, personnel expense has a positive effect on firm 
productivity. Thus, the effect of capital intensity on firm productivity is significant only in the non -manufacturing 
industry (β=0.8278, p<0.01). Furthermore, the existence of labor union, the volume of training and the level of R&D 
do not have a significant effect on firm productivity in both industries. 
 
Table 7. Results of Regression of Employee Benefits by Industry Type (cluster: firm) 
Fixed effect estimation 
 DV: Sales per employee 
 Model 2 Model 3 
Manufacturing industry Non-manufacturing industry 
 β SE β SE 
W -.1464 (.1819) -.1836 (.1843) 
W* Ln(L) .1085** (.0463) .0919*** (.0246) 
W* Ln(K) -.0367 (.0288) -.0258* (.0151) 
UNION .0169 (.1951) .2241 (.2110) 
TRAIN -.0131 (.0907) .0355 (.1307) 
Ln(L) -1.3682*** (.4561) -.9348** (.3673) 
Ln(K/L) .6288 (.4296) .8278*** (.2260) 
Ln(LC/L) .4131*** (.0836) .3584*** (.0920) 
Ln(RD/L) -.0143 (.0236) -.0087 (.0260) 
W*D -.0034 (.0096) .0010 (.0113) 
R2 0.3255 0.5918 
N 867 706 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We also compare the effect of employee benefits on firm productivity by firm size because there is a significant 
difference in terms of productivity and employee benefits according to size 8. Firm productivity increases by 7.8% 
through the labor-embodied effect when employee benefits increase by one unit in large firms (β=.0775, p<0.1) (see 
Table 8). On the other hand, employee benefits are not significantly associated with firm productivity through the 
labor-embodied effect in small and medium-sized firms. Hence, the effect of employee benefits on firm productivity 
through the capital-embodied effect is significant and negative in large firms (β=-.0547, p<0.01). On the other hand, 
such effect is positive and significant in small and medium-sized firms (β=.0404, p<0.1). Overall, there is no 
significant effect of employee benefits on firm productivity through  the disembodied effect in all firms regardless of 
firm size. Yet, capital intensity and personnel expense per worker have a positive effect on firm productivity when 
firm size is large. However, capital intensity is not significantly associated with firm productivity in small and 
medium-sized firms. Thus, labor union, training and R&D do not have a significant effect on firm productivity in all 
firms regardless of firm size. There is no difference in the effect of benefits on a firm’s productivity by size.  However, 
                                                                 
7
 The productivity per employee in the manufacturing industry is 5.681 and that in the non-manufacturing industry is 5.1839. We tested the 
difference of productivity per employee in both industries and found that there is a significant difference between the two ( t=12.72, p<0.01). The 
average employee benefits in the manufacturing industry is 1.4901 and those in the non-manufacturing industry is 1.9169. There is also a significant 
difference of employee benefits between the two (t=-6.080, p<0.01). This reulst implies that we need to analyze the effect of employee benefits by 
industry type. 
8
 The average value of productivity (i.e., output per worker) at a large company is 5.6173, whereas that of small & medium-sized company is 5.2470 
(t=9.364, p<0.01). The average value of employee welfare at a large company is 3.1567, whereas that of small & medium-sized company is 0.4808 
(t=49.573, p<0.01). These results imply that we need to analyze the productivity effect of employee welfare depending on the size of a company. 
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labor-embodied effect is stronger in the large firms and capital-embodied effect is stronger in the small and medium-
sized firms. 
 
Table 8. Results of Regression of Employee Benefits by Firm Size (cluster: firm) 
Fixed effect estimation 
 DV: Sales per employee 
 Model 4 Model 5 
Large firms Small and medium firms 
Variable β SE β SE 
W .2387 (.3281) -.2658 (.2551) 
W* Ln(L) .0775* (.0398) -.0142 (.0466) 
W* Ln(K) -.0547*** (.0172) .0404* (.0237) 
UNION .0331 (.1772) .2826 (.2484) 
TRAIN -.0666 (.1207) -.0130 (.0940) 
Ln(L) -.4466 (.6146) -.7168 (.6625) 
Ln(K/L) 1.2306*** (.2452) -.4786 (.3549) 
Ln(LC/L) .4994*** (.0948) .3625*** (.0887) 
Ln(RD/L) .0107 (.0234) -.0145 (.0282) 
R2 0.5088 0.3095 
N 815 758 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
We found that benefits per employee has a positive effect on productivity. The result is consistent with those in 
previous studies (Dulebohn et al, 2008; Allen & Clark, 1987; Pierce & Newstorm, 1980; Schein et al, 1977; Choi, 
1996; Kang, 2002; Shin, 2005; Kim, 2007; Kwak et al., 2011; Kim, 2012). However, this study analyzes the effect of 
benefits on employee productivity using two distinctive effects -- the embodied and disembodied effects. 
 
We discovered that the effect of benefits  on productivity was made through the embodied effect, not through the 
disembodied effect. Thus, we need to think about why embodied effect does influence employee productivity. First, 
the agent theory and transaction cost theory argued that benefits cause moral hazard and free-rider problems among 
employees. In addition, benefits are evenly distributed to all employees, and not disproportionately to employees based 
on individual performance. Therefore, benefits hardly contribute to favorable relationships between management and 
unions. 
 
Second, the effect of benefits on employees may be deferred. This statement implies that the effect of benefits on 
employees could be realized in the long-term, not in the short-term. Disembodied effect (e.g., a favorable relationship 
between management and unions) is usually realized in the long-term. Kruse (1992) suggested that the effect of 
benefits on employees could be low in the short-term because it is realized after the employees retire or become 
unemployed. Such deferred effect of benefits could frequently occur in the non-monetary type of benefits, such as 
pensions and unemployment insurance. 
 
We also discovered the effect of benefits on productivity to be different between firms in the manufacturing industry 
and the non-manufacturing industry. We suspect that the working conditions in the manufacturing industry are worse 
than those in the non-manufacturing industry in Korea. Therefore, the effect of benefits on productivity is stronger in 
the manufacturing industry than the non-manufacturing industry. 
 
The effect of benefits on productivity are compared between large, small, and medium-sized firms. Only embodied 
effect is significant regardless of firm size. However, large firms realize the effect of benefits through mainly labor-
embodied effect and small and medium-sized firms through mainly capital-embodied effect. In Korea, the size of 
benefits in small and medium-sized firms is one third of that in large firms. We suspect that benefits in the small and 
medium-sized firms are not large enough to increase a labor-embodied effect. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study tested the effect of benefits on employee productivity using the panel data between 2005 and 2009 in Korea. 
The results suggest that benefits have a positive effect on employee productivity through the labor-embodied effect, 
such as loyalty for the firm or employee engagement. Therefore, managers need to pay more attention as to why only 
the labor-embodied effect is significant in explaining the relationship between benefits and employee benefits. In turn, 
the labor policy and systems need to be improved in order to enhance the disembodied effect. This effect also implies  
that firms need to know how to operate, manage and improve benefits programs in order to build good employee 
relations. 
 
The benefits of small and medium-sized firms are less than 60% of those of large firms in Korea. Such differences 
increase the relative deprivation of employees in small and medium-sized firms (Cho et al., 2011, Han, 2000, Lee, 
2013). The results convey that only the capital-embodied effect is significant in explaining the relationship between 
benefits and employee productivity. This effect implies that the size of benefits in small and medium-sized firms is 
not sufficient to generate a labor-embodied effect. Thus, expanding benefits and improving the quality of such benefits 
in small and medium-sized firms are critical and urgent needs . 
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